Facts: In 1871, the legislature of Illinois passed a law that regulated grain-elevator operators by forcing them to obtain licenses and setting a limit on the rates for grain storage. When Ira Munn violated the law, she contended that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause and was therefore unconstitutional. When the Illinois State Supreme Court ruled against her, she appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision: 7-2 Illinois wins. Chief Justice Waite delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: The Court ruled that a State Legislature may regulate private property that is “of public consequence” for the public interest.

Reasoning: While the 5^th Amendment of the Constitution prevents the Federal Government from depriving a person’s “life, liberty, or property without due process of law” and the 14^th Amendment guarantees this right, the Magna Charta was the first law to establish this doctrine. However, before the 14^th Amendment, “it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law,” the Court wrote. The 14^th Amendment only “prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.”

Some private property, the Court ruled, may be regulated. “Property,” the Court wrote, “does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.” In fact, “when private property is ‘affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only,’” the Court wrote, quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale. In other words, when private property touches the public’s interest, it is no longer simply private right, and a state government can therefore regulate it. When private property affects the public interest, regulating that property does not equate to deprivation of due process.

Applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the Court ruled that Ira Munn’s business “most certainly ‘tends to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use.’” Therefore, the Court ruled, the Illinois Legislature has the power to regulate Munn’s business.

While this power “may be abused,” the possibility of abuse “is no argument against its existence,” wrote the Court. In fact, “the people must resort to the polls, not to courts” to right any future wrongs done by the Legislatures.

Although “the warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the limits of the State of Illinois,” some of the stored grain may travel across state lines. However, this does not necessarily mean that the business is directly “connected with interstate commerce,” the Court wrote. “Certainly until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations,” the Court ruled, “the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in doing so it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction.”

Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court.

The Obama administration is looking into the rights of people in jail: does it violate one’s rights to be routinely strip-searched in prison if that person has committed a minor crime?

This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments from one side.  Tom Goldstein argued that jailers must first have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to search an inmate to such levels. Goldstein represents Albert Florence, a man who twice was strip-searched at two New Jersey jails over a six-day period. His crime: an unpaid traffic fine.

However, in responding to the prosecution’s argument, Justice Kennedy said that wardens and guards must be careful when dealing with prisoners. “You don’t know who these people are,” Kennedy said. “You arrest them for traffic (violations) and they may be some serial killer you do not know.”

The Court is scheduled to hear more arguments in the upcoming days.

Facts: When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H. W. Bush sent military forces to the area and participated in a blockade, “generally by presidential order and at times with congressional concurrence.” When the President declared a significant increase of troops in the Persian Gulf in November 1990, one member of the Senate and fifty-three members of the House of Representatives brought a preliminary injunction against the President, hoping to arrest preemptive troop escalation and thus prevent war.

Decision: The Court decides in Bush’s favor.

Doctrine: Except in “factually close or ambiguous” cases, the Executive branch does not have the power to define a military action in a way that would make a Congressional declaration of war unnecessary. In such a case, the Court can only “compel action by the President or the Congress” if the case is ripe, if both the Legislative and Executive branches have pursued concrete actions.

Reasoning: In the case, the Department of Justice argued that the question of whether or not a military action requires of declaration of war is only answerable by “delicate judgments by the political branches,” for “there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards to apply.” The Executive contended that it alone had the power to determine whether or not a military action was an “act of war” or an “offensive military attack” and could therefore decide that a declaration of war from Congress was constitutionally necessary or not.

The District Court disagreed and ruled that the Department of Justice’s view of the Executive’s power was “far too sweeping.” This view “would evade the plain language of the Constitution,” the Court wrote. It puts “the congressional power to declare war …  at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive” and thereby violates the separation of powers instituted in the Constitution, the Court maintained.

If however, “the issue is factually close or ambiguous or fraught with intricate technical military and diplomatic baggage,” the Court wrote, the Court could “defer to the political branches to determine whether or not particular hostilities might qualify as a ‘war’.”

Under the Constitution, though, the Court ruled, “an offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thousand United States servicemen … could be described as a ‘war’.” In principle, the Court ruled that the circumstances of the case require “congressional approval … if Congress desires to become involved.”

However, the Court wrote, “As a matter of the deference that is due to the other branches of government, the Judiciary will undertake to render decisions that compel action by the President or the Congress only if the dispute before the Court is truly ripe.” In other words, the Court will only issue a decision if “all the factors necessary for a decision are present then and there.” If the necessary issues were not evident, the Court would not provide a ruling.

An official act passed by Congress is among those necessary factors, the Court wrote. Since the Congress had not officially passed an action authorizing or condemning the Executive branch’s actions, “it would be both premature and presumptuous for the Court to render a decision on the issue of whether a declaration of war is required.” They maintained that “unless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe,” and therefore, the Court cannot compel the President to obtain authorization from Congress.

In the same way, the Court ruled that the Executive is not “clearly committed to immediate military operations that may be equated with a ‘war’” as to require a “judicial decision.” In initiating “a peacekeeping force,” stating that the increase of troops in the area was only “an adequate offensive military option, and scheduling diplomatic meetings between the heads of states, the Court ruled that “the Executive Branch has not shown a commitment to a definitive course of action sufficient to support ripeness.” Therefore, the Court maintained that a decision “is not necessary at this time.”

Many legal scholars and lawyers think that old laws are archaic laws.

For example, some argue that states that still have 55 mph speed limits on the interstate are living in the late 1950s, a time when President Dwight Eisenhower began creating what we now know as the interstate system.

In small towns especially, some legislatures just don’t repeal laws. For example, a law in Texas mandates that criminals give their victims oral or written notice 24 hours in advance of the crime they are planning to commit.

However, ancient law is often extremely important to society, for it has stood the test of time. If, throughout centuries of application, it survives, it is quite possible that it is because it is good law.

Ancient law is also a necessary part of law, for it is its foundation. In every case except for revolution, law is built upon precedent. Understanding the earliest law, then, can help one understand the value of recent law.

Here are a few examples:

1. Code of Hammurabi

This law, created by the Babylonian king Hammurabi in approximately 1700 BCE, is one of the oldest of the old. It is one of the oldest, deciphered writing of significant length.

Approximately one-half of the code concerns contracts between individuals. For example, it dictates the wages that a surgeon or ox-driver should receive.

2. Magna Carta

The Magna Carta, or “The Great Charter” in Latin, is an English law signed by King John in 1215. The law forced King John of England to announce certain liberties of his subjects and agree that his power was not arbitrary. It is the first law to limit the rights of a monarch and recognize fundamental rights held by persons.

After he signed the charter, King John consistently disobeyed it, but the law was used as a beacon of hope in the English Civil War of the mid-1600s and at the time of the American Revolution in the late-1700s.

3. The Constitution of the United States of America

In 1787, more than 220 years ago, the Founding Fathers of America signed this document, creating the longest lasting republic in the history of the world. The Constitution is the “supreme law” of the land. Through its lenses, all federal laws must be viewed.

In short, “old” laws are not necessarily outdated. Naturally, some are, but many have stood the test of time and are the bedrock on which other laws are built.

As Edmund Burke, a British political theorist of the 18^th Century, wrote, it is important to not throw off the “ancient principles” while being stirred up by the passions of the moment. Doing such is not only disrespectful. It is enormously dangerous.

Facts:

In April 1861, after the outbreak of armed conflict, President Abraham Lincoln pronounced that the Southern states were in rebellion and had their ports blockaded. The owners of 4 ships that were confiscated challenged the constitutionality of the seizures, stating that the Executive’s power does not include the power to confiscate enemy ships when Congress has not declared war. When a federal court ruled in favor of the President, the ship owners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision:

5 – 4 U. S. Government wins. Justice Grier writes the Opinion of the Court with Justices Wayne, Swayne, Miller, and Davis concurring. Justice Nelson writes the Dissent with Justices Clifford, Catron, and Taney concurring.

Doctrine:

The Court ruled that both the Law of Nations and legislation passed by Congress give the Executive power “to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States” before Congress has officially declared war. Therefore, the President had the constitutional authority to order the blockade and seize the ships in question.

Reasoning:

The Court ruled that the President had the authority to confiscate the ships in question because the Law of Nations and Congress gave that power to the Executive.

The power to capture a “neutral vessel or property on the high seas” is “governed and adjudged under the law of nations,” wrote the Court. The decision declared, “To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war must exist de facto.” If the rebelling States were not prosecuting their rights by force, the President was not conducting a jus belli, or just war, and the Executive would be violating the law of nations.

According to the Court, the Constitution does not give the Executive the “power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State.” However, in 1795 and 1807, Congress had given the President power to defend the United States “in case of invasion by foreign nations” and to “suppress insurrection against the government of a State” by commanding the militia, military, and navy. The Court wrote that the President “is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority” because of these acts passed by Congress.

Once the Court declared the appropriate doctrine, they applied it to the question at hand. In short, they punted. Whether or not there existed a state of war and rebellion that necessitated the President’s actions was a question “to be decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the Political Department of the government to which this power was intrusted.” The Court concluded by declaring that “the proclamation of blockade is, itself, official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure.”

During the Civil War, the northern United States was under threat of financial fraud from both the Confederate south and counterfeiters within the country. In order to combat this, President Lincoln passed what was called the “False Claims Act” (or FCA) in 1863, which would implement stiff fines on any attempts at fraud against the U.S. This is also known as “Lincoln’s Law” or “The Informer’s Act”.

Initially adopted by Congress, the FCA specifically focused on fraud committed by military contractors, but was made applicable to all government contractors in general. The punishment for a military fraud offense was a significant $2000 fine for each claim, plus double the amount which the government sustained in damages.

Additionally, the False Claims Act made a provision for scouts known as “Relaters” to seek out cases of fraud in exchange for half of the total recovered funds. By this, citizens were greatly encouraged to be on the lookout for illegal activity, which may have not been otherwise noticed. This greatly aided the swift enforcement of the Act.

More recently, the government has made several amendments to the bill in 1986. Since those amendments, the government has recovered over $22 billion in fraudulent funds, all because of “Lincoln’s Law”.