Facts: Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public or private school a federal crime. Twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was found holding a .38 caliber handgun into a San Antonio high school and was charged with breaking a Texas law that prohibited the possession of firearms on school property. The state charges were dropped when federal agents brought him to a federal district court because of his violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. When the court found Lopez guilty, it sentenced him to six months in prison and two years probation. Lopez appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court, and the court reversed the lower court’s decision. United States then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
Decision: 5 – 4 Lopez wins. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Doctrine: Under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress possesses the power to regulate “the channels of interstate commerce,” completely “intrastate activities” that affect “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” However, Congress does not have the authority to regulate such intrastate activity to the extent that it destroys the “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”
Reasoning: The Court ruled that Congress, under its interstate commerce power, possesses the power to regulate three categories. “First,” the Court stated, “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court ruled that interstate commerce is “intercourse between … parts of nations and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” In that decision, the Court ruled that Congress possesses the plenary power to regulate interstate commerce but not the “exclusively internal commerce of a State.” The Court determined that Lopez’s activity did not fit into this category.
In addition, Congress may “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” The previous Courts realized that “enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope.” However, the Court again ruled that the possession of a firearm on the premises of a high school did not fit into this category.
Lastly, the Court wrote that congress may regulate “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possesses the power to regulate intrastate commerce when it is necessary for the effective regulation of interstate commerce. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possess the power to regulate completely local activity “if it exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce” whether directly or indirectly. The Court stated that “where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”
The government argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is constitutional “because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce” because it prevents violent crimes. Violent crimes, the government argued, are a substantial cost on the economy. “Through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population,” the government contended. Secondly, the government stated that “violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe,” and therefore substantially affects interstate commerce.
The “implications” of the government’s argument, wrote the Court, take Congress’ power down a dangerous road. “If we were to accept the Government’s arguments,” the Court declared, “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” In short, the Court would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate” if it accepted the government’s reasoning.
Although the previous Courts had “expanded” Congress’ power under the interstate commerce clause, the Court in 1990 “decline[d] here to proceed any further” and ruled that “this power is subject to outer limits.” The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel ruled that Congress’ power “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”
Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court.