From fishermen to politicians, people tell tales. Sometimes, they claim that the fish was 12 inches larger than it was in reality, and other times, they claim that they will lower taxes.

Since the founding of the United States, 3,475 Medal of Honor awards have been given to American soldiers. The last was given in September of 2011. It is the highest honor the President of the United States can give a man under his command. According to the New York Times, Donald B. Verrilli Jr., the solicitor general of the United States said, “Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation’s armed forces.”

According to The Stolen Valor Act in 2006, falsely claim military honors is a federal crime.

When Xavier Alvarez, a resident of Arizona, claimed that he was “an ex-Marine who had been awarded the Medal of Honor” at a local meeting, according to the L. A. Times, he was convicted. He maintained that the 1st Amendment protects his right to say such things. Most recently, U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Xavier and declared the law unconstitutional.

Now, the Supreme Court is set to decide if the freedom of speech shields people who makes these lies in U.S. vs. Alvarez.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer said, “There is a real harm…. It does hurt the medal if people falsely go around saying they have this medal when they don’t.”

Other Justices, on the other hand, contend that the Stolen Valor Act puts the 1st Amendment Right to the freedom of speech at risk.  ”Where do you stop?” Chief Justice John Roberts asked. The law, they argue, could lead down a slippery slope to laws against such things as lying about an extramarital affair, the Holocaust, a college degree or high-school diploma, or to impress a date.

Furthermore, Xavier’s lawyer, Jonathan D. Libby, argued that “there is a significant difference between a criminal sanction that puts someone in prison versus simply exposing them for what they are, which is a liar.”

Facts: Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public or private school a federal crime. Twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was found holding a .38 caliber handgun into a San Antonio high school and was charged with breaking a Texas law that prohibited the possession of firearms on school property. The state charges were dropped when federal agents brought him to a federal district court because of his violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. When the court found Lopez guilty, it sentenced him to six months in prison and two years probation. Lopez appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court, and the court reversed the lower court’s decision. United States then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Decision: 5 – 4 Lopez wins. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress possesses the power to regulate “the channels of interstate commerce,” completely “intrastate activities” that affect “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” However, Congress does not have the authority to regulate such intrastate activity to the extent that it destroys the “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”

Reasoning: The Court ruled that Congress, under its interstate commerce power, possesses the power to regulate three categories. “First,” the Court stated, “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court ruled that interstate commerce is “intercourse between … parts of nations and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” In that decision, the Court ruled that Congress possesses the plenary power to regulate interstate commerce but not the “exclusively internal commerce of a State.” The Court determined that Lopez’s activity did not fit into this category.

In addition, Congress may “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” The previous Courts realized that “enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope.” However, the Court again ruled that the possession of a firearm on the premises of a high school did not fit into this category.

Lastly, the Court wrote that congress may regulate “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possesses the power to regulate intrastate commerce when it is necessary for the effective regulation of interstate commerce. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possess the power to regulate completely local activity “if it exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce” whether directly or indirectly. The Court stated that “where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”

The government argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is constitutional “because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce” because it prevents violent crimes. Violent crimes, the government argued, are a substantial cost on the economy. “Through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population,” the government contended. Secondly, the government stated that “violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe,” and therefore substantially affects interstate commerce.

The “implications” of the government’s argument, wrote the Court, take Congress’ power down a dangerous road. “If we were to accept the Government’s arguments,” the Court declared, “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” In short, the Court would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate” if it accepted the government’s reasoning.

Although the previous Courts had “expanded” Congress’ power under the interstate commerce clause, the Court in 1990 “decline[d] here to proceed any further” and ruled that “this power is subject to outer limits.” The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel ruled that Congress’ power “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”

Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court.

Facts: Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1951 which mandated that “persons engaged in the business of accepting wages” must register for and pay an occupational tax. The tax applied to interstate as well as intrastate wagers. When Mr. Kahriger was found in violation to the law, he “moved to dismiss on the ground that the sections upon which the information was based were unconstitutional.”

Decision: 5 – 4 United States wins. Justice Reed delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Under the Constitution, Congress possesses the power to require licenses of an industry and levy an occupational tax on that industry even if that tax is on intrastate commerce and even “if the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize” that industry.

Reasoning: Kahriger argued that “Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to tax, has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of the Act and has thus infringed the police power which is reserved to the states.” He argued that the interstate commerce clause does not delegate to Congress the power to “tax a specific business” that is “not within its power to regulate.”

The Court wrote that “the precedents are many upholding taxes similar to this wagering tax as a proper exercise of the federal taxing power.” In fact, in the License Tax Cases, the Court ruled that Congress has the power to require those who sell lottery tickets or liquor to buy “a license under the Internal Revenue Act of Congress,” for by doing so, Congress has “no power of regulation nor any direct control” over those businesses. At that time, the Court ruled that “the granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax.”

Kahriger held that since Congress’ “motive to suppress wagering” was evident, “this tax is not a proper exercise of such taxing power.” Congress attempted to discourage the practice of intrastate gambling by taxing it, stated Kahriger. Because “the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure,” stated Kahriger, it is unconstitutional. However, the Court ruled that “a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed.” The Court stated that “regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue” and is therefore a constitutional use of Congress’ taxing powers. “It is hard to understand why the power to tax should raise more doubts because of indirect effects than other federal powers,” wrote the Court. “When federal power to regulate is found, its exercise is a matter for Congress.”

Finally, the Court ruled that it was not up to the Judiciary to decide if the law would have “a crushing effect on businesses deemed unessential or inimical to the public welfare.” They put simply that the “remedy for excessive taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the Courts.”

Facts: In order to prevent foreclosures, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Minnesota Moratorium Act of 1934, which gave the states courts the power to postpone the mortgage payments of farmers and homeowners. When John Blaisdell applied for a postponement of his payments to the Home Building & Loan Association, a trial court dismissed his case. When the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s decision and approved his extension, the Home Building & Loan Association appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the law violated the Constitution.

Decision: 5 – 4 Blaisdell wins. Chief Justice Hughes delivers the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: State legislatures have the power to allow temporary and limited restraints on the enforcement of contracts in order to secure “the vital interests of the community.”

Reasoning: Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution states that no state shall make any “law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” However, the Court ruled that both the limitation of the state Legislature’s power and the power reserved to the Legislature must “be construed in harmony with each other.” In other words, neither can “be construed so as to destroy” the other. They ruled, “The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly, or indirectly.” Rather, the question is “whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.”

While the Court ruled that in normal economic conditions, the state legislature would not possess the power to postpone the debts of homeowners, the Court also held that a state legislature possesses the power “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” “While emergency does not create power,” the Court ruled, “emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”

In fact, the Court wrote that “a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community” in times of emergency. “The question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the goods of all depends,” wrote the Court. It would be unreasonable to hold that “the constitutional prohibition [on the Obligation of Contracts] should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity such as a fire, flood, or earthquake.”

The Court ruled that such an interpretation of the Constitution is reasonable. To limit the Constitution “to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon” it, would be to prevent the Constitution from adapting “to the various crises of human affairs,” wrote the Court. The Court found “no warrant for the conclusion that the clause has been warped by” this interpretation.

Since “an emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community,” the Minnesota law was ruled constitutional. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Facts: New York’s legislature gave two men, Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton, a monopoly on the operation of steamboats on all waters within the jurisdiction of the state. Livingston and Fulton then granted Aaron Ogden the exclusive right to operate a ferry between New York City and various ports along New Jersey’s coast. Ogden requested an injunction from the courts of New York when Thomas Gibbons ran a competing ferry on those waterways. Ogden claimed that Gibbon’s operation of vessels in those waters was violating the monopoly that the New York legislature had indirectly given him. Gibbons argued that his vessels were licensed by a 1793 congressional act that authorized vessels “employed in the coasted trade and fishers.” When the New York courts upheld Ogden’s claims, Gibbons appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision: 9-0 Gibbon wins. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Congress’ power to regulate Commerce “among the several states” is to create rules for the “commercial intercourse” between the states, including that which occurs within the borders of several states. When a state law interferes with Congress’ power to regulate Commerce, it is unconstitutional.

Reasoning: The Court ruled that although the Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government,” there is not “one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance” to strictly limiting the powers of government based on the explicit words of the text. “That narrow construction,” the Court argued, would “cripple the government and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted.”

The Constitution grants Congress the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Congress’ power to regulate Commerce “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” In order “to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the words,” the Court wrote.

Defining commerce to mean solely navigation, wrote the Court, would be to “restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations.” On the contrary, commerce is “the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” In a way, commerce is the trading of commodities, not just traffic.

For years, it had been widely held that the text of the Constitution includes “every species of commercial intercourse between the United and foreign nations.” Therefore, the Court argued that it is reasonable to imply that Congress also has the power to regulate all commercial intercourse among the states, since the Constitution grants Congress both the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states.

In addition, “commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior” because, according to the Court, the word “among” in the Constitution equates to “intermingled with.” “If a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a state,” the Court wrote, then the Congress can regulate commerce “within a state.” Congress’ power to regulate Commerce may “pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies,” the Court argued. However, although Congress’ power to regulate commerce can extend into the states, it does not apply to actions of commerce “which are completely within a state.” The Constitution’s use of the word ‘among’ “may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one,” wrote the Court.

“The sole question is, can a state regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, while Congress is regulating it?” Although debates about which powers the states possess and which the federal government possesses “must arise … in our complex system,” this does not mean that those laws must “interfere.” Some argue, wrote the Court, that although Congress has the power to regulate Commerce among the states, the states, themselves, may severally exercise the same power within their respective jurisdictions,” for this power is an “inseparable attribute of sovereignty.” However, “the act of a state inhibiting” the Congress from using any licensed ships within its territory is “in direct collision with that act,” wrote the Court. If the Constitution gives Congress this power, a state may not interfere with it. Limiting Congress’ power to regulate Commerce among the states by preventing it from using vessels in the waterways within the jurisdiction of New York is to “explain away the Constitution of our country and leave it a magnificent structure indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.”

Therefore, the Court ruled in Gibbons’ favor.

Facts: In 1871, the legislature of Illinois passed a law that regulated grain-elevator operators by forcing them to obtain licenses and setting a limit on the rates for grain storage. When Ira Munn violated the law, she contended that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause and was therefore unconstitutional. When the Illinois State Supreme Court ruled against her, she appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision: 7-2 Illinois wins. Chief Justice Waite delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: The Court ruled that a State Legislature may regulate private property that is “of public consequence” for the public interest.

Reasoning: While the 5^th Amendment of the Constitution prevents the Federal Government from depriving a person’s “life, liberty, or property without due process of law” and the 14^th Amendment guarantees this right, the Magna Charta was the first law to establish this doctrine. However, before the 14^th Amendment, “it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law,” the Court wrote. The 14^th Amendment only “prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.”

Some private property, the Court ruled, may be regulated. “Property,” the Court wrote, “does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.” In fact, “when private property is ‘affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only,’” the Court wrote, quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale. In other words, when private property touches the public’s interest, it is no longer simply private right, and a state government can therefore regulate it. When private property affects the public interest, regulating that property does not equate to deprivation of due process.

Applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the Court ruled that Ira Munn’s business “most certainly ‘tends to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use.’” Therefore, the Court ruled, the Illinois Legislature has the power to regulate Munn’s business.

While this power “may be abused,” the possibility of abuse “is no argument against its existence,” wrote the Court. In fact, “the people must resort to the polls, not to courts” to right any future wrongs done by the Legislatures.

Although “the warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the limits of the State of Illinois,” some of the stored grain may travel across state lines. However, this does not necessarily mean that the business is directly “connected with interstate commerce,” the Court wrote. “Certainly until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations,” the Court ruled, “the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in doing so it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction.”

Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court.

The Obama administration is looking into the rights of people in jail: does it violate one’s rights to be routinely strip-searched in prison if that person has committed a minor crime?

This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments from one side.  Tom Goldstein argued that jailers must first have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to search an inmate to such levels. Goldstein represents Albert Florence, a man who twice was strip-searched at two New Jersey jails over a six-day period. His crime: an unpaid traffic fine.

However, in responding to the prosecution’s argument, Justice Kennedy said that wardens and guards must be careful when dealing with prisoners. “You don’t know who these people are,” Kennedy said. “You arrest them for traffic (violations) and they may be some serial killer you do not know.”

The Court is scheduled to hear more arguments in the upcoming days.

Facts: When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H. W. Bush sent military forces to the area and participated in a blockade, “generally by presidential order and at times with congressional concurrence.” When the President declared a significant increase of troops in the Persian Gulf in November 1990, one member of the Senate and fifty-three members of the House of Representatives brought a preliminary injunction against the President, hoping to arrest preemptive troop escalation and thus prevent war.

Decision: The Court decides in Bush’s favor.

Doctrine: Except in “factually close or ambiguous” cases, the Executive branch does not have the power to define a military action in a way that would make a Congressional declaration of war unnecessary. In such a case, the Court can only “compel action by the President or the Congress” if the case is ripe, if both the Legislative and Executive branches have pursued concrete actions.

Reasoning: In the case, the Department of Justice argued that the question of whether or not a military action requires of declaration of war is only answerable by “delicate judgments by the political branches,” for “there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards to apply.” The Executive contended that it alone had the power to determine whether or not a military action was an “act of war” or an “offensive military attack” and could therefore decide that a declaration of war from Congress was constitutionally necessary or not.

The District Court disagreed and ruled that the Department of Justice’s view of the Executive’s power was “far too sweeping.” This view “would evade the plain language of the Constitution,” the Court wrote. It puts “the congressional power to declare war …  at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive” and thereby violates the separation of powers instituted in the Constitution, the Court maintained.

If however, “the issue is factually close or ambiguous or fraught with intricate technical military and diplomatic baggage,” the Court wrote, the Court could “defer to the political branches to determine whether or not particular hostilities might qualify as a ‘war’.”

Under the Constitution, though, the Court ruled, “an offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thousand United States servicemen … could be described as a ‘war’.” In principle, the Court ruled that the circumstances of the case require “congressional approval … if Congress desires to become involved.”

However, the Court wrote, “As a matter of the deference that is due to the other branches of government, the Judiciary will undertake to render decisions that compel action by the President or the Congress only if the dispute before the Court is truly ripe.” In other words, the Court will only issue a decision if “all the factors necessary for a decision are present then and there.” If the necessary issues were not evident, the Court would not provide a ruling.

An official act passed by Congress is among those necessary factors, the Court wrote. Since the Congress had not officially passed an action authorizing or condemning the Executive branch’s actions, “it would be both premature and presumptuous for the Court to render a decision on the issue of whether a declaration of war is required.” They maintained that “unless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe,” and therefore, the Court cannot compel the President to obtain authorization from Congress.

In the same way, the Court ruled that the Executive is not “clearly committed to immediate military operations that may be equated with a ‘war’” as to require a “judicial decision.” In initiating “a peacekeeping force,” stating that the increase of troops in the area was only “an adequate offensive military option, and scheduling diplomatic meetings between the heads of states, the Court ruled that “the Executive Branch has not shown a commitment to a definitive course of action sufficient to support ripeness.” Therefore, the Court maintained that a decision “is not necessary at this time.”

Facts:

In April 1861, after the outbreak of armed conflict, President Abraham Lincoln pronounced that the Southern states were in rebellion and had their ports blockaded. The owners of 4 ships that were confiscated challenged the constitutionality of the seizures, stating that the Executive’s power does not include the power to confiscate enemy ships when Congress has not declared war. When a federal court ruled in favor of the President, the ship owners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Decision:

5 – 4 U. S. Government wins. Justice Grier writes the Opinion of the Court with Justices Wayne, Swayne, Miller, and Davis concurring. Justice Nelson writes the Dissent with Justices Clifford, Catron, and Taney concurring.

Doctrine:

The Court ruled that both the Law of Nations and legislation passed by Congress give the Executive power “to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States” before Congress has officially declared war. Therefore, the President had the constitutional authority to order the blockade and seize the ships in question.

Reasoning:

The Court ruled that the President had the authority to confiscate the ships in question because the Law of Nations and Congress gave that power to the Executive.

The power to capture a “neutral vessel or property on the high seas” is “governed and adjudged under the law of nations,” wrote the Court. The decision declared, “To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war must exist de facto.” If the rebelling States were not prosecuting their rights by force, the President was not conducting a jus belli, or just war, and the Executive would be violating the law of nations.

According to the Court, the Constitution does not give the Executive the “power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State.” However, in 1795 and 1807, Congress had given the President power to defend the United States “in case of invasion by foreign nations” and to “suppress insurrection against the government of a State” by commanding the militia, military, and navy. The Court wrote that the President “is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority” because of these acts passed by Congress.

Once the Court declared the appropriate doctrine, they applied it to the question at hand. In short, they punted. Whether or not there existed a state of war and rebellion that necessitated the President’s actions was a question “to be decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the Political Department of the government to which this power was intrusted.” The Court concluded by declaring that “the proclamation of blockade is, itself, official and conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure.”