Since the founding of the United States, 3,475 Medal of Honor awards have been given to American soldiers. The last was given in September of 2011. It is the highest honor the President of the United States can give a man under his command. According to the New York Times, Donald B. Verrilli Jr., the solicitor general of the United States said, “Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation’s armed forces.”

According to The Stolen Valor Act in 2006, falsely claim military honors is a federal crime.

When Xavier Alvarez, a resident of Arizona, claimed that he was “an ex-Marine who had been awarded the Medal of Honor” at a local meeting, according to the L. A. Times, he was convicted. He maintained that the 1st Amendment protects his right to say such things. Most recently, U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Xavier and declared the law unconstitutional.

Now, the Supreme Court is set to decide if the freedom of speech shields people who makes these lies in U.S. vs. Alvarez.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer said, “There is a real harm…. It does hurt the medal if people falsely go around saying they have this medal when they don’t.”

Other Justices, on the other hand, contend that the Stolen Valor Act puts the 1st Amendment Right to the freedom of speech at risk.  ”Where do you stop?” Chief Justice John Roberts asked. The law, they argue, could lead down a slippery slope to laws against such things as lying about an extramarital affair, the Holocaust, a college degree or high-school diploma, or to impress a date.

Furthermore, Xavier’s lawyer, Jonathan D. Libby, argued that “there is a significant difference between a criminal sanction that puts someone in prison versus simply exposing them for what they are, which is a liar.”

According to U.S. Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, considered to be among the most liberal appellate judges, “Proposition 8 serves no purpose and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples.”

Instead of dismantling the same-sex marriage ban in a general sense, the court took a more narrow approach. In short, it did not address the issue of whether the Constitution protects the rights of all same-sex couples to marry. Instead, because same-sex couples had the right to marry for a brief time in California, a proposition cannot take that away.

If a minority group possesses a right, the people of a state do not possess the Constitutional power to “use their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed,” wrote Reinhardt.

“Without a legitimate reason for doing so, the people of California violated the Equal Protection Clause” of the federal Constitution, Reinhardt wrote.

“The Constitution simply does not allow for laws of this sort,” the Court maintained.

Decision: 2-1

• Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a Jimmy Carter appointee, held that the law was unconstitutional.
• Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, appointed by President Bill Clinton, concurred with Reinhardt.
• Judge N. Randy Smith, a conservative appointed by President George W. Bush, dissented.

According to Rogers, a British citizen, “the evacuation of the ship was completely chaotic. There was certainly no ‘women and children first’ policy. It was disgusting.” During the evacuation process, Rogers was separated from her children and lost her deceased husband’s ashes. Rogers was planning on scattering his ashes on her trip.

Says Rogers, “Thank God we didn’t do as they had told us as we may not have made it off the ship alive.” At first, the crew told passengers to return to their cabin because the ship was experiencing a simple technical problem.

Carnival’s Response

The capsizing of the ship claimed 11 lives and 21 people are still missing–approximately a week later. After a catastrophic event like this, the Cruise Firm is inspecting each of their ships. Carnival Corp.to conduct a fleet-wide review of its cruise ships’ safety and emergency response procedures.

Micky Arison, chairman and CEO of, said the company wants “to make sure that this kind of accident doesn’t happen again.”

That is not enough to passengers like Rogers.

In the third and final season of the mildly successful FOX comedy, Arrested Development, Bob Loblaw is introduced. While Loblaw is a lawyer who takes himself seriously, viewers can’t help but chuckle at his non-self-aware quirkiness.

In Loblaw’s commercial,

• He repeatedly closes a large, leather book, supposedly a legal dictionary.
• He only accepts cash for identity theft cases.
• “Why should you go to jail for a crime someone else…noticed?” he asks.
• The cheesy stock-music in the background is supposedly meant to suggest that the know-it-all lawyer is an inept person.

Watch the Bob Loblaw Commercial.

It’s the day after Christmas, and as I’m writing this post for our legal blog, I can’t help but realize that what Loblaw said to his friends, is the same thing I said to mine: “I thought that maybe I would stay in and work on my law blog.”

Here’s to a great 2012 for AttorneysOnYourSide.com!

It even decides between the different schemes of government that are within America. James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, wrote that because “controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions” of the state and federal government will naturally arise, there must be, “under the general government” a “tribunal which is ultimately to decide” between the two (Federalist 39).

The Supreme Court of Pakistan is facing a similar task. Instead of deciding between the powers of the state and the powers of the federal government, the Pakistani Supreme Court must mediate between the civilian government, headed by President Asif Ali Zardari, and the powerful military government.

The military government alleges that an ally of Zardari inked a secret memo, seeking U.S. help to curb the Army’s powers.

According to Newsweek Pakistan, “The scandal threatens to embroil Zardari and fan tensions between his weak government and the military‚ the chief arbiter of power in Pakistan‚ forcing aides to deny that controversy and illness could see him driven from office.”

While America’s judicial system is controversial and political, let’s be thankful that it has not, at least since the Civil War, attempted to prevent full scale war. Wrote Madison, “Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact” (Federalist 39).

Burlington, NC, October 24, 2011 – The Vernon Law Firm is pleased to announce the  inclusion of Wiley P. Wooten in the 2012 edition of The Best Lawyers in America® in the practice of Family Law.

Since its inception in 1983, Best Lawyers has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Because Best Lawyers is based on an exhaustive peer-review survey in which more than 41,000 leading attorneys cast almost 3.9 million votes on the legal abilities of other lawyers in their practice areas, and because lawyers are not required or allowed to pay a fee to be listed, inclusion in Best Lawyers is considered a singular honor. Corporate Counsel magazine has called Best Lawyers “the most respected referral list of attorneys inpractice.”

Upon hearing the news of his selection to The Best Lawyers in America® Wiley P. Wooten, Esq., Shareholder and Director, commented, “At Vernon Law, we are committed to delivering excellent legal representation to every client we serve.  I am proud and honored to be listed in this well respected publication.”

Vernon Law, founded in 1933, has been assisting clients with their legal needs in Alamance County and throughout the Burlington-Greensboro area in North Carolina for over 74 years.  The attorneys at Vernon Law are licensed to practice in North Carolina and in federal courts, and together they represent over 220 years of combined legal experience.

Vernon Law attorneys have been leaders in the legal profession and in the Burlington-Greensboro North Carolina community, holding office as President of the North Carolina Bar, President of the Alamance County Bar, and Clerk of Court of Alamance County, as well as many other positions of civic and business leadership.

Facts: Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public or private school a federal crime. Twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was found holding a .38 caliber handgun into a San Antonio high school and was charged with breaking a Texas law that prohibited the possession of firearms on school property. The state charges were dropped when federal agents brought him to a federal district court because of his violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. When the court found Lopez guilty, it sentenced him to six months in prison and two years probation. Lopez appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court, and the court reversed the lower court’s decision. United States then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Decision: 5 – 4 Lopez wins. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress possesses the power to regulate “the channels of interstate commerce,” completely “intrastate activities” that affect “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” However, Congress does not have the authority to regulate such intrastate activity to the extent that it destroys the “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”

Reasoning: The Court ruled that Congress, under its interstate commerce power, possesses the power to regulate three categories. “First,” the Court stated, “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court ruled that interstate commerce is “intercourse between … parts of nations and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” In that decision, the Court ruled that Congress possesses the plenary power to regulate interstate commerce but not the “exclusively internal commerce of a State.” The Court determined that Lopez’s activity did not fit into this category.

In addition, Congress may “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” The previous Courts realized that “enterprises that had once been local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope.” However, the Court again ruled that the possession of a firearm on the premises of a high school did not fit into this category.

Lastly, the Court wrote that congress may regulate “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possesses the power to regulate intrastate commerce when it is necessary for the effective regulation of interstate commerce. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress possess the power to regulate completely local activity “if it exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce” whether directly or indirectly. The Court stated that “where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”

The government argued that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is constitutional “because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce” because it prevents violent crimes. Violent crimes, the government argued, are a substantial cost on the economy. “Through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population,” the government contended. Secondly, the government stated that “violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe,” and therefore substantially affects interstate commerce.

The “implications” of the government’s argument, wrote the Court, take Congress’ power down a dangerous road. “If we were to accept the Government’s arguments,” the Court declared, “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” In short, the Court would be “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate” if it accepted the government’s reasoning.

Although the previous Courts had “expanded” Congress’ power under the interstate commerce clause, the Court in 1990 “decline[d] here to proceed any further” and ruled that “this power is subject to outer limits.” The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel ruled that Congress’ power “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”

Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court.

Decision: 5 – 4 United States wins. Justice Reed delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Under the Constitution, Congress possesses the power to require licenses of an industry and levy an occupational tax on that industry even if that tax is on intrastate commerce and even “if the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize” that industry.

Reasoning: Kahriger argued that “Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to tax, has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of the Act and has thus infringed the police power which is reserved to the states.” He argued that the interstate commerce clause does not delegate to Congress the power to “tax a specific business” that is “not within its power to regulate.”

The Court wrote that “the precedents are many upholding taxes similar to this wagering tax as a proper exercise of the federal taxing power.” In fact, in the License Tax Cases, the Court ruled that Congress has the power to require those who sell lottery tickets or liquor to buy “a license under the Internal Revenue Act of Congress,” for by doing so, Congress has “no power of regulation nor any direct control” over those businesses. At that time, the Court ruled that “the granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax.”

Kahriger held that since Congress’ “motive to suppress wagering” was evident, “this tax is not a proper exercise of such taxing power.” Congress attempted to discourage the practice of intrastate gambling by taxing it, stated Kahriger. Because “the sole purpose of the statute is to penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of a tax measure,” stated Kahriger, it is unconstitutional. However, the Court ruled that “a federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed.” The Court stated that “regardless of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue” and is therefore a constitutional use of Congress’ taxing powers. “It is hard to understand why the power to tax should raise more doubts because of indirect effects than other federal powers,” wrote the Court. “When federal power to regulate is found, its exercise is a matter for Congress.”

Finally, the Court ruled that it was not up to the Judiciary to decide if the law would have “a crushing effect on businesses deemed unessential or inimical to the public welfare.” They put simply that the “remedy for excessive taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the Courts.”

Decision: 5 – 4 Blaisdell wins. Chief Justice Hughes delivers the Opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: State legislatures have the power to allow temporary and limited restraints on the enforcement of contracts in order to secure “the vital interests of the community.”

Reasoning: Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution states that no state shall make any “law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” However, the Court ruled that both the limitation of the state Legislature’s power and the power reserved to the Legislature must “be construed in harmony with each other.” In other words, neither can “be construed so as to destroy” the other. They ruled, “The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly, or indirectly.” Rather, the question is “whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.”

While the Court ruled that in normal economic conditions, the state legislature would not possess the power to postpone the debts of homeowners, the Court also held that a state legislature possesses the power “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” “While emergency does not create power,” the Court ruled, “emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”

In fact, the Court wrote that “a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community” in times of emergency. “The question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the goods of all depends,” wrote the Court. It would be unreasonable to hold that “the constitutional prohibition [on the Obligation of Contracts] should be so construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great public calamity such as a fire, flood, or earthquake.”

The Court ruled that such an interpretation of the Constitution is reasonable. To limit the Constitution “to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon” it, would be to prevent the Constitution from adapting “to the various crises of human affairs,” wrote the Court. The Court found “no warrant for the conclusion that the clause has been warped by” this interpretation.

Since “an emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community,” the Minnesota law was ruled constitutional. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Decision: 9-0 Gibbon wins. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.

Doctrine: Congress’ power to regulate Commerce “among the several states” is to create rules for the “commercial intercourse” between the states, including that which occurs within the borders of several states. When a state law interferes with Congress’ power to regulate Commerce, it is unconstitutional.

Reasoning: The Court ruled that although the Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government,” there is not “one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance” to strictly limiting the powers of government based on the explicit words of the text. “That narrow construction,” the Court argued, would “cripple the government and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted.”

The Constitution grants Congress the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Congress’ power to regulate Commerce “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” In order “to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the words,” the Court wrote.

Defining commerce to mean solely navigation, wrote the Court, would be to “restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations.” On the contrary, commerce is “the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” In a way, commerce is the trading of commodities, not just traffic.

For years, it had been widely held that the text of the Constitution includes “every species of commercial intercourse between the United and foreign nations.” Therefore, the Court argued that it is reasonable to imply that Congress also has the power to regulate all commercial intercourse among the states, since the Constitution grants Congress both the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states.

In addition, “commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior” because, according to the Court, the word “among” in the Constitution equates to “intermingled with.” “If a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a state,” the Court wrote, then the Congress can regulate commerce “within a state.” Congress’ power to regulate Commerce may “pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies,” the Court argued. However, although Congress’ power to regulate commerce can extend into the states, it does not apply to actions of commerce “which are completely within a state.” The Constitution’s use of the word ‘among’ “may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one,” wrote the Court.

“The sole question is, can a state regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, while Congress is regulating it?” Although debates about which powers the states possess and which the federal government possesses “must arise … in our complex system,” this does not mean that those laws must “interfere.” Some argue, wrote the Court, that although Congress has the power to regulate Commerce among the states, the states, themselves, may severally exercise the same power within their respective jurisdictions,” for this power is an “inseparable attribute of sovereignty.” However, “the act of a state inhibiting” the Congress from using any licensed ships within its territory is “in direct collision with that act,” wrote the Court. If the Constitution gives Congress this power, a state may not interfere with it. Limiting Congress’ power to regulate Commerce among the states by preventing it from using vessels in the waterways within the jurisdiction of New York is to “explain away the Constitution of our country and leave it a magnificent structure indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.”

Therefore, the Court ruled in Gibbons’ favor.